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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Federal Statute Denying Public Employees the Right
to Assert the Right to Strike Declared Unconstitutional.-The National
Association of Letter Carriers, the certified bargaining representative of some
six thousand bargaining units of postal employees, brought suit to have de-
dared unconstitutional a federal statute' which prohibited employees of the
federal government from asserting the right to strike and from joining any
organization which they knew asserted such a right. The plaintiff conceded, for
purposes of this action, that Congress may prohibit government employees from
actually striking,2 and confined this suit to the resolution of whether Congress
may impinge on their freedoms of speech and association, as provided in the
first amendment. A three judge district court's holding that the statute was an
unwarranted invasion of the constitutionally protected rights of public em-
ployees3 rejected the government's contention that the word "asserts" should
1. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp. IV, 1969) provides: "Any individual may not accept or hold a
position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Colum-
bia if he-
(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the
United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or
(4) is a member of any organization of employees of the Government of the United
States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia that he
knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or the gov-
ernment of the District of Columbia. '
This suit also challenged the following parts of the Post Office oath: "I do not and will
not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency
thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof.
I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of
Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United
States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the
United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization."
2. The prohibition of the right to strike by public employees is currently being challenged.
United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, Civil No. 3279-69 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 19, 1969).
However, despite this suit, postal employees in New York City, impatient with Congressional
footdragging concerning postal reform and increased wage proposals, recently voted to go on
strike for the first time in the history of the national postal system. N.Y. Times, March 19,
1970, at 1, col 8. The strike soon spread across the nation. N.Y. Times, Miarch 20, 1970, at 1,
col. 8.
3. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D.D.C. 1969),
cert. granted, 38 US.L.W. 3419 (US. April 27, 1970) (No. 1270). Before reaching the
merits, the court rejected the government's argument that since the statute concerns only
individuals, the plaintiff lacked standing. The court reasoned that if the association asserts
the right to strike, its members will be subject to criminal prosecution. Therefore, the associa-
tion is being injured in that individuals will be inhibited from joining the association. Id. at
548. Furthermore, the federal courts have frequently let associations vindicate the rights of
its members. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415, 428 (1963) ; Louisiana ex rel. Gremilion
v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961).
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be construed to mean "incites,"'4 thus narrowing the proscribed conduct. The
court noted that the government's construction left the statute unconstitution-
ally vague.5 National Association of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp.
546 (D.D.C. 1969), cert. granted, 38 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. April 27, 1970)
(No. 1270).
In the early part of this century it was generally conceded that the state, as
an employer, could demand any qualification it deemed reasonable from its
employees as a condition of employment. 6 This demand often involved the
deprivation of one of the employee's constitutional rights.7 The courts, however,
disposed of any constitutional conflict by stating that one could freely choose to
regain his constitutional rights by simply leaving the employ of the state.8
In addition, the court rejected the government's argument that the mere statement that
members of the association intend to violate the statute failed to establish a justiciable con-
troversy. The court stated that the threat of criminal sanctions had the effect of Inhibiting
members' first amendment rights, and thus the case was ripe for decision. 305 F. Supp. at
549. See note 18 infra.
4. 305 F. Supp. at 550. The court so held despite a discussion in the House of Representa-
tives which indicated a Congressional intent to the contrary. In reply to a question by Rep.
McCormack as to the meaning of the word "asserts," Rep. Tumulty said the word did not
mean the mere declaration of opinion, but required some overt act. He felt the word was
tantamount to incitement. 101 Cong. Rec. 10,765 (1955).
5. 305 F. Supp. at 550.
6. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892)
(city policemen forbidden to become members of, or solicit funds for, any political com-
mittee); Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 A. 234 (1923) (fire department regulation
forbidding officers to become members of an association which a few years before had
organized a strike of city firemen upheld); McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920) (city employees prohibited from joining any organization unless it first received
approval from appropriate city official, and, after creation of such organization, withdrawal
of approval by city official mandated dissolution of the organization, on pain of dismissal);
Brownell v. Russell, 76 Vt. 326, 57 A. 103 (1904) (city charter forbade members of the
police department from taking part in any political caucus or canvassing).
7. E.g., in People ex rel. Clifford v. Scannell, 74 App. Div. 406, 77 N.Y.S. 704 (Ist Dep't
1902), aff'd mem. 173 N.Y. 606, 66 N.E. 1114 (1903), Clifford, a member of the Firemen's
Mutual Benefit Association, was dismissed for violating a rule of the fire department that
prohibited employees from joining associations for the purpose of influencing legislation on
their own behalf. Clifford appeared before a legislative revision commission, in uniform, to
urge legislation on behalf of the firemen. He also issued circulars, published an article, and
gave interviews calculated to stimulate legislative and popular sympathy for the firemen.
The court rejected his claim that he had conducted these activities as a citizen, not as a
fireman. The court ruled that the need of the fire department for discipline to maintain an
efficient corps outweighed the individual's rights to freely petition others and exercise his
freedom of speech. Id." at 413-14, N.Y.S. at 709-10.
There were other instances during the first half of this century in which the constitutional
rights of public employees to speak and associate freely were systematically denied. E.g.,
Ricks v. Department of State Civil Serv., 200 La. 341, 8 So. 2d 49 (1942); State ex rel.
Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 765, 42 N.W.2d 796 (1950); Stowe v. Ryan, 135 Ore. 371, 296
P. 857 (1931); State ex rel. Curtis v. Steinkellner, 247 Wis. 1, 18 N.W.2d 355 (1945).
8. E.g., United States v. Curtis, 12 F. 824, 840 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.), afl'd sub nom. Ex parto
1970] CASE NOTES
The first amendment rights of federal employees were further restricted by
the "gag rules"9 of the early 1900's. Congress recognized and corrected the
abuses and injustices engendered by the "gag rules"' 0 with the passage of the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 191211 which provided federal employees with the
right to petition Congress, either as individuals or collectively, for wage in-
creases and other benefits connected with their employment. This act repre-
sented a first step in recognizing that public employees were being seriously
hampered in their collective bargaining efforts; however subsequent labor legis-
lation, which has greatly improved the bargaining status of private employees,
has expressly excluded the public employees.'- While the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
did establish the right to organize, this remained a naked right which did not
materially improve the public employees' bargaining position.'3
Curtis, 106 US. 371 (1882) ; State v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 1006, 163 S.W.2d 990, 996 (1942);
Duffy v. Cooke, 239 Pa. 427, 442, 86 A. 1076, 1081 (1913).
The philosophy of the period is well summarized in the statement of Justice Holmes, then
a member of Massachusetts' highest court: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor &
Bd. of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
9. These were executive orders which prohibited public employees from voicing any job
dissatisfaction with their employer, Congress. The first "gag rule" in the form of an executive
order was issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on Jan. 31, 1902 and restricted the first
amendment right of association and speech in that federal employees were prohibited from
organizing and petitioning Congress for pay increases or any attempt to gain influence for
their own interests. (Reprinted in 48 Cong. Rec. 5223 (1912)). President Taft issued a similar
executive order, Exec. Order No. 1142, on Nov. 26, 1909. (Reprinted in 48 Cong. Rec. 5223
(1912)).
10. Through the curtailment of the rights of federal employees, the executive department
of government maintained control of the federal bureaucracy in order to promote discipline,
efficiency and morale and checked the possibility of the civil servants establishing any political
power. See 29 US. Civil Serv. Comm'n Ann. Rep. 24 (1913).
11. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555.
12. E.g., Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 US.C. §§ 152(2), (3) (1964) ; Norris-LaGuardia
Act of 1932, 29 US.C. §§ 102, 104, 107, 113 (1964), which the Supreme Court held in United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 270-76 (1947), not applicable to the federal
government as employer.
13. Public employees have not been given the formal safeguard procedures that labor
legislation has granted to private employees. The following three prohibitions against public
employees seriously weaken their position at the bargaining table: (1) strikes and picketing
are prohibited activities and the prohibition of such activities is not unconstitutional or a
violation of civil rights. Eg., C.I.O. v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946);
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944); rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 88 (1945). (2) any type of dosed shop, union shop, or other form of union security
agreement between a government agency and a union representing employees is invalid.
E.g., Petrucci v. Hogan, S Misc. 2d 480, 27 N.YS.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941). (3) any agreement
for automatic dues checkoff, absent a wage assignment from each individual employee con-
cerned, is invalid. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Reid, 193 Misc. 702, 85 N.YS.2d 378 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946).
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The Hatch Act,14 enacted by Congress in 1939, presented the Supreme Court
with its first real opportunity to examine a federal statute which restricted a
public employee's first amendment right of free speech. In United Public
Workers v. Mitchell,15 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
section of the Hatch Act which forbade employees of the executive branch of
the government to take any active part in political management or in political
campaigns.16 The Court used a balancing test by measuring the extent to which
guaranteed freedoms protect the individual, as against the evil of political
partisanship by government employees.17 Employing this test the Court decided
to uphold the statute,' 8 but did not clearly specify what rights of appellant
were being weighed. 19
14. Act of Aug. 2, 1839, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640,
54 Stat. 767 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 118i, k-n (1964) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 594 et seq. (1964).
15. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
16. It should be noted that the position of the employee and his duties in the campaign
are irrelevant. In Mitchell, plaintiff, a roller in the U.S. mint, was acting as a committeeman
in a local ward. He claimed the Hatch Act infringed his first amendment rights and arbitrarily
discriminated against federal employees in that he wished to engage in acts of political man-
agement and campaigning, and was being unreasonably prohibited from exercising that right
solely because he was a federal employee. The government argued that the Act was necessary
to prevent public employees from "playing politics" with a resultant loss of efficiency and
public confidence, and possibly giving rise to favoritism in the government service.
17. 330 U.S. at 96.
18. Id. at 103. The Court dismissed the complaint brought by several other plaintiffs,
holding that the mere existence of a statute that infringed upon first amendment freedoms
was insufficient to constitute a case or controversy under the constitution; rather the person
bringing the suit must be directly threatened by the statute. Id. at 89-90. Such a conclusion
might seem to dictate that the court in Blount should dismiss the complaint as not justiciable.
However, as the court pointed out, the "chilling effect" doctrine seemed to have replaced
Mitchell, at least in first amendment cases. 305 F. Supp. at 549. This doctrine says that a
justiciable case or controversy is established by an allegation that a general threat of enforce-
ment of an official policy chills the exercise of first amendment freedoms. National Student
Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16,
372 F.2d 817 (2d. Cir. 1967). See generally 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1165 (1969). The court in
Blount decided that the threat of loss of employment had a sufficient chilling effect on the
public employees' freedoms of speech and association to warrant court intervention. 305 F.
Supp. at 549.
19. The Court stated that Congress may regulate the conduct of government employees,
even to the extent of encroaching upon the Bill of Rights. However, the Court will Interfere
only when the regulation passes beyond the then existing concept of government power.
"That conception develops from practice, history, and changing educational, social and
economic conditions." 330 U.S. at 102. Thus, without considering if the Congress could en-
croach further on the rights of government employees, the Court merely said that Congress
may do so here. While this approach may seem dubious today, it at least represented a gain
from Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of
an act which prohibited government employees from requesting, giving to, or receiving from
other government employees money or anything of value for political purposes. Act of Aug.
15, 1876, ch. 287, § 6, 19 Stat. 169. The Court spoke of the benefit government received from
the act, but did not even discuss the infringed rights of the employees.
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The balancing test was again used in Adler v. Board of Education.20 In
Adler, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a New York State law
which rendered ineligible for employment in the public school system a person
who was a member of any organization which advocated the overthrow of the
government by force, violence, or any unlawful means.2 1 The Court, although
recognizing the right of teachers to assemble, speak, think and believe as they
will, discussed the right and duty of the state to maintain the integrity of the
school system, and decided in favor of the state.2 2 Thus the Court, in balancing
the first amendment rights of public employees against the authority of the
state to condition employment on grounds it deemed necessary, decided in
favor of restricting the rights of public employees.2 It is apparent then that
while public employees may have won the right to organize in 1912, little real
progress in public employees' freedom of speech or association had been made
since that time.
In Wieman v. Updegraff,2 4 which was decided the same year as Adler, the
Supreme Court clarified its position that public employees "have no right to
work for the state." Here the Court struck down a state loyalty oath that
required a state employee to swear that he was not, nor had been for the past
five years, a member of any organization listed by the United States Attorney
General as subversive.2 The Court concluded that barring persons from state
employment solely on the basis of membership in such organizations, regardless
of their knowledge or dedication to the goals of the organization, was patently
arbitrary and discriminatory, and thus violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.2 6 The Court dismissed the concept of whether or
not there exists a right to work for the state as irrelevant.2-
Any doubt as to the remaining validity of Adler was dearly disspelled in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents28 where the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the idea that public employees must surrender their constitutional rights when
employed by the government.2 9 In Keyishian the Court struck down a series
20. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
21. N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (1953).
22. 342 US. at 492-93.
23. Justice Minton, for the majority, stated: "[public employees] have no right to work
for the State in the school system on their own terms. They may work for the school
system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the proper authorities of New York."
Id. at 492 (citation omitted).
24. 344 US. 183 (1952).
25. Okla. Sess. Laws, tit. 51, ch. 1, § 2 (1962).
26. 344 US. at 192.
27. Id.
28. 385 US. 589 (1967). Accord, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), in which the
first amendment right of freedom of association was held to apply to public employees as
well as private citizens. 384 U.S. at 17.
29. Id. at 605-06. This was not a novel idea since the Supreme Court had already, rejected
a number of loyalty oaths as too vague, indicating that public employees were entitled to at
least some first amendment rights. Eg., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v.
Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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of New York statutes designed to prevent "subversives" from teaching in the
school system. The statutes required the dismissal of teachers guilty of sedi-
tious or treasonable acts, °0 or who advocated the overthrow of the government
by force, violence or any unlawful means, or published any material urging
such unlawful overthrow, or joined any group of persons advocating such an
overthrow of the government.3 ' In addition, membership in the Communist
Party was prima fade evidence for disqualificationY. 2 Appellants refused to
sign an oath declaring they were not members of the Communist Party, and
brought suit seeking to have the entire New York program declared uncon-
stitutional. The Court struck down the statutes holding that mere membership
in an organization, even though one is fully aware of the unlawful aims of the
organization, without the specific intent to further those aims, is violative of
constitutional protections.33 Thus it appears under the ruling of Keyishian that
public employees are similarly entitled to constitutional protection just as pri-
vate employees.3 4
The Supreme Court has at times also resorted to the "less drastic means"
test3" in first amendment cases, regardless of whether the government derived
a needed benefit at the expense of a private right.30 In Shelton v. Tucker, 7 the
Court used this test to strike down an Arkansas statute 8 which required every
teacher in the public schools to file annually a listing of every organization of
which he had been a member, or to which he had contributed, during the last
five years.39 The Court ruled that the statute was too broad, since it forced
teachers to reveal all their associations, even those which clearly presented no
threat to the government.40 Justice Stewart pointed out that where Congress
acts to protect the national interest, "even though the governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the
light of the less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."' 41
30. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105(3) (1959).
31. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 105(1) (1959).
32. Id.
33. 385 U.S. at 609-10.
34. See also Sullivan, Free Speech and the Public Employee, 58 Ill. B.J. 174, 185 (1969);
Note, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 166-71 (1967).
35. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960). When the government can accomplish a given end by a variety of equally
effective means, the "less drastic means" test dictates that it choose the means least restrictive
of individual liberties. For a discussion of the "less drastic means" test, see Note, 78 Yale
L.J. 464 (1969).
36. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288 (1964).
37. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
38. Act 10, § 2 [1959] Ark. Acts 2d Extraord. Sess. 2018.
39. 364 U.S. at 490.
40. Id. at 488.
41. Id. (footnotes omitted). In cases where the government has allegedly used too broad
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In United States v. Robe 42 the Court again used the "less drastic means"
test, this time to invalidate43 a federal statute" which prohibited federal em-
ployees working at a defense facility from being members of the Communist
Party. The Court declared the statute unconstitutional because it prohibited
all members of the Communist Party from engaging in defense work, even
though a particular member might not seek the overthrow of the United States
government, or might lack the specific intent of furthering the unlawful aims
of the Party.45 The Court discussed the need for precision of regulation in
areas of constitutionally protected rights, 40 and reiterated the holding of Skel-
ton by stating: "Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a qess
drastic' impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms." 47 The
Court recognized that it could have balanced the governmental interests against
the asserted first amendment rights of the appellee, but refused to label one
right more important than the other, suggesting that there is no need to balance
the conflicts when Congress can be more circumspect in denying first amend-
ment rights.48
In Blount, the proscription against asserting the right to strike would there-
fore appear unconstitutional under the "less drastic means" test as interpreted
by earlier case law. 49 As the court in Blount pointed out, the statute proscribed
all government employees from asserting the right to strike, even those who
would legitimately advocate a change in the law to legalize strikes by govern-
ment employees.50 The court cited the Keyishian case, among others, as illus-
trative of the fact that the Supreme Court has struck down legislation and
a sweep in proscribing constitutionally protected rights, the aggrieved party has an opportu-
nity to salvage his rights by appealing to other means of preserving the national interests
that would not impinge on his rights. It has even been suggested that the government assume
the burden of proof that no "less drastic means" are available to it. Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1960) (Harlan, J, concurring).
42. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
43. Id. at 267-68.
44. Subversives Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 5(a)(1)(D), 64 Stat. 992.
45. 389 US. at 262.
46. Id. at 265.
47. Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at n.20.
49. There was no need for the court in Blount to weigh the rights of public employees
against the interests of government, since in first amendment cases the 'qcss drastic means"
test alone can justify the court's decision in striking down the statute. However, in a recent
Supreme Court case a balancing test was used in upholding a public employee's first amend-
ment rights. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). This case concerned public
employee criticism of government officials which the Court felt compelled to weigh against
the efficient running of government. It seems therefore that if the statute was not too broad
under the "less drastic means" test, then it would be subject to a balancing test, as in
Pickering.
50. 305 F. Supp. at 550. The court rejected the government's contention that in practice
it enforces the statute only against those who actually commit overt acts to incite others
to strike. Id.
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loyalty oaths which result in the abandonment of the freedoms of speech and
association.51 The court did not differentiate between public and private em-
ployees' rights, and recent Supreme Court decisions support this position. 2
The court's decision in Blount that federal employees' first amendment right
of freedom of association was being violated by the government is also sup-
ported by a recent Supreme Court decision, Elfbrandt v. Russell.5 In Elfbrandt
state employees were subject to prosecution if they knowingly and willfully
became members of any group devoted to the overthrow of the United States
government. The Court ruled that mere knowledge of the unlawful aim of the
group was insufficient to warrant the prosecution of members.04 The statute
was held unconstitutional because, absent a showing of specific intent, it
amounted to guilt by association.5 5 Thus a statute that condemns all members
of an organization, as the one in Blount, impinges on constitutionally protected
freedoms.56
The decision in Blount follows the line of Supreme Court cases expanding
the rights of public employees since the Mitchell and Adler decisions. If
Mitchell has any validity today, it appears to be strictly confined to political
activity by government employees. It is apparent that the court in Blount con-
sidered the public employee entitled to the same first amendment rights as pri-
vate employees, following the view of the Supreme Court in Elfbrandt and
Keyishian. However, the court went beyond those decisions in permitting public
employees to advocate the right to strike. These constitutional safeguards can
only improve the public employees' bargaining position with the government."
51. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389
U.S. 54 (1967); Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969). The court in
Stewart declared unconstitutional the first two sections of the statute under consideration In
Blount, 5 U.S.C. § 3333 (Supp. IV, 1969) and 5 U.S.C. § 7311(1), (2) (Supp. IV, 1969)
which, read together, required employees of the federal government to take an oath that
they do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States, nor are members
of any organization which so advocates.
52. E.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) in which the Supreme Court ruled that
freedom of association applied to public employees as well as private employees. Id. at 17.
53. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
54. Id. at 16.
55. Id. at 19.
56. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135-36 (1943). The court in Blount was also justified in striking
down the statute for its overbreadth in denying public employees their freedom of speech.
305 F. Supp. at 550. There are many Supreme Court decisions which have struck down
similar statutes for overbreadth. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generally
42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 750 (1967). Furthermore, it has been held that the mere advocacy of an
illegal aim, without some overt incitement, is fully protected by the first amendment. E.g.,
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969);. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
57. Today it is apparent that public employees can no longer be compelled to surrender
their first amendment rights when they enter government service. Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Shelton v.
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The decision in Blount, however, did not grant public employees the right to
strike, nor should it in any way interfere with the efficient operation of govern-
ment. The decision provided the public employees with a voice, and with the
right to make that voice even stronger by joining together in associations which
assert the right to strike. In this manner people close to the operation of
government are better able to criticize and improve the efficiency of govern-
ment, and to bargain with the government, as employer, from a position of
strength.
International Law-State of Residence of Majority of Shareholders of Ex-
propriated Corporation Held Not to Have Standing to Sue.-The Barce-
lona, Light and Power Company, Limited was incorporated in 1911 in Toronto,
Canada and maintained its principal office there. It formed a number of sub-
sidiary companies, mostly Canadian incorporated, for the purpose of developing
an electric power system in Catalonia, Spain. When the Spanish civil war
erupted, the company, through its subsidiaries, was the major supplier of
Catalonia's electricity requirements. During these years a large portion of
Barcelona Traction's share capital passed from Canadian and United States
nationals to Belgian nationals.'
In 1936, the servicing of foreign and domestic bonds which had been issued
earlier by the company 2 was suspended due to the Spanish civil war.3 The
servicing of foreign bonds was never resumed. Because of this, Barcelona Trac-
tion made a proposal for reimbursement of the debt. This proposal was rejected
by the Spanish authorities' and the Belgian government put in a claim on
Tucker, 364 US. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 US. 183 (1952). Nevertheless,
despite their advances, public employees still do not share the same full constitutional
privileges as their counterparts in the private sector. See notes 12-13 supra. When their
constitutional rights are at odds with a government interest, the courts should use a balanc-
ing test. However, when the proscribed regulation is too broad, the statute should fall due
to overbreadth under the "less drastic means" test. When the proscribed action is more than
necessary to the fulfillment of the legislative purpose, or where the proscribed action is
inherently vague, the Court will strike the statute down. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US.
479 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
1. Although Spain contended that the ownership by Belgian nationals was not proven,
it was presumed for the purposes of standing.
2. The shares passed both to individuals and to a Belgian Corporation (Sodete Inter-
nationale d'Energie Electrique).
3. The Company issued several series of bonds, some in local currency (pesetas), and
others in sterling. The sterling bonds were serviced out of transfers to Barcelona Traction
effected by its subsidiaries operating in Spain.
4. In 1940 the Spanish exchange control authorized the resumption of interest payments
on the peseta bonds but refused to permit the transfer of foreign currency without which
interest payments could not be resumed.
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behalf of its resident shareholders. The Spanish government, however, refused
to remedy the situation.5
In 1948 three Spanish holders of recently acquired Barcelona Traction bonds
petitioned a Spanish court for a declaration adjudging the company bankrupt
because of its failure to pay interest on the bonds. Three days later a judgment
declaring the company bankrupt was rendered. A commissioner in bankruptcy
was appointed and an order made for seizure of the assets of Barcelona Trac-
tion and its subsidiaries. Pursuant to the judgment, the commissioner replaced
the management personnel and, after further proceedings, new shares of the
company were issued and the former shares invalidated. The new shares were
then purchased by a Spanish company organized for that purpose which thereby
gained complete control of the enterprise for Spain.
After the bankruptcy declaration, the Belgian, British, Canadian, and Amer-
ican governments made representations to the Spanish government stating
their interest in the situation of the bondholders resident in their respective
nations. By 1951 Britain, the United States and Canada, which was protecting
the interests of its corporate nationals, had ceased their efforts.0 The Belgian
government, however, maintaining that it represented a preponderance of the
shareholders, brought an action in the International Court of Justice in 1958.
Essentially the action was one for damages allegedly caused to the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited because of the actions of the
Spanish government. The Spanish government made four preliminary objec-
tions, the most crucial of which was that the Belgian government had no
standing to sue. Proceedings were suspended at this point while the parties
attempted to resolve the dispute through negotiations. Upon their failure to
do so, the case was reinstated and a hearing was held in 19647 to decide the
preliminary objections. The court dismissed the first two objections 8 and joined
the third (standing) and the fourth (exhaustion of local [Spanish] remedies)
for consideration on the merits.
After an extensive trial, the International Court of Justice finally decided the
case in 1970. Although it heard arguments on the merits of the claim, the court
held, 15-1,0 that the Belgian government lacked standing to sue because Bar-
5. The Spanish government stated that authorization of the transfers would not be forth-
coming until it was proven that the foreign currency was to be used to repay debts arising
out of the genuine importation of foreign capital into Spain.
6. Shortly before this time, a tripartite commission (with representatives of Britain,
Canada and the United States) bad concluded that the Spanish refusal to authorize the
transfers was justified, whereupon these three countries ceased their efforts.
7. Barcelona, Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd., Preliminary Objections, [1964] I.CJ.
6.
8. The first two preliminary objections raised by Spain concerned the effect of discon-
tinuing the proceeding and the effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice on the present claim.
9. The statute of the International Court of Justice states: "If the court includes upon
the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to
choose a judge. . . ." 59 Stat. 1055, 1059 art. 34-1(3) (1945). Accordingly a Belgian judge
(Riphagen) was appointed. His was the lone dissent.
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celona Traction, as a Canadian corporation, was a juristic national of only
that state and its claim could not be espoused by Belgium merely because the
majority of shareholders were Belgian nationals. Case Concerning Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), [1970]
LCJ., 9 Intl Legal Materials 227 (1970).
The statute of the International Court of Justice provides that only states
can be parties to actions brought before the court.10 Consequently, if an in-
dividual is to be represented before the court, his claim must be espoused by
his state. The problem which then arises is how to determine the nationality
of a particular claimant since, "[it is the bond of nationality between the
state and the individual which alone confers upon the state the right of diplo-
matic protection."11
Concerning diplomatic protection of an individual, nationality is determined
by one of several factors: his place of birth;'- his country of naturalization 3
(a status which, if bona fide, would have priority over place of birth), and
other transactions between an individual and a nation which would constitute
a sufficient nexus to be determinative. 4 In the case of conflicting factors,
habitual residence and "factors such as the centre of his interests, his family
ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given
country and inculcated in his children"'0 will also be considered. In general,
however, the court will prefer the "real and effective nationality. 1 06
In the corporate sphere, three possible determinants of corporate nationality
have traditionally been suggested: the nationality of its shareholders,1 7 the
nation under whose laws it is incorporated,18 and the national situs of its siege
sociale.19
Several arguments have been advanced against the first suggestion-that is,
10. 59 Stat. 1055, 1059 art. 34-1 (1945).
11. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railways Case (19391 P.CIJ., ser A/B, No. 76 at 16. "A
State which puts forward a claim before... [aln international tribunal must be in a posi-
tion to show that it has locus standi for that purpose. The principal and almost exclusive
factor creating that locus standi is the nationality of the claimant...." 1 L. Oppenheim,
International Law: A Treatise 347 (8th ed. 1955).
12. C. Fenwick, International Law 302 (4th ed. 1965).
13. Id. at 306; H. Jacobini, International Law: A Text 132-33 (rev. ed. 1968).
14. Kunz, The Nottebohm judgment, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 536, 551 (1960). "An individual
has the nationality of a state that confers it upon him provided there exists a genuine link
between the state and the individual." Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 26 (1965).
15. The Nottebohm Case, [19551 LC.J. 4, 22.
16. Id.
17. In Re Mexico Plantagen G.m.b.H. (1931-32) Ann. Dig. 265 (No. 135).
18. H. Henn, Corporations § 77 (1961).
19. I. G. Schwartzenberger, International Law 393 (3d ed. 1957). The author proposes
two additional tests of corporate nationality: the domicile of the corporation; and the
beneficial ownership. Although these have not generally been recognized, it is noteworthy
that they "pierce the corporate veil" and examine the actual material interests in the
corporation.
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that the nationality of the shareholders dictates that of the corporation.20 A
corporation is a juridical person distinct from its members.2 1 To allow the
nationality of the shareholders to determine that of the corporation would be
to dilute this principle. Moreover, in the modem world of international business,
many corporations have shareholders in numerous countries.2 2 Frequently, one
corporation holds shares in another. To employ this method of determination,
in this latter instance, would lead to the dissipation of the corporate nation-
ality beyond all traces of recognition. One commentator, in considering such
a situation, suggested, "it might well be, in such circumstances, that the num-
ber of possible state claimants in respect of an injury to one large company
could comprise half the world." 23 In rejecting this contention in the Barcelona
Traction case, the International Court of Justice observed further that since
Barcelona Traction was in receivership and thus unliquidated in Canada, its
shareholders had no right to the corporate assets.24 A corporate right is not
ipso facto a shareholder right.25
A concept of nationality based strictly on the nation in which the corporation
has its siege sociale is equally problematical. In In re Mexico Plantagen
G.m.b.H.26 the presiding claims commissioner rejected the idea "because the
principal seat of business of a corporation may change frequently in accordance
with the needs or convenience of the corporation."2 7 Frequently the siege
sociale is not the actual center of corporate activity. Some support for the idea
existed, however, in France and Italy, in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury,28 but in the present case it was not considered since the siege sociale of
Barcelona Traction was already in the incorporating state.
In the case under discussion the court accepted the principle that a corpora-
tion is a national of the country where it is incorporated.20 The United States
has recognized this principle since 1865,50 when the United States government
was asked to intercede with the Colombian government on behalf of American
20. Although the nationality of corporate shareholders was considered in cases concerned
with trade with enemy laws, this is generally recognized as a unique and necessary precaution
taken for defense purposes. H. Henn, supra note 18, at § 88 (1961); W. Gould, An Introduc-
tion to International Law 442-45 (1957); Domke, "Piercing the Corporate Veil" in the Laws
of Economic Warfare, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 77. But see Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v.
United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 225 (1904).
21. I G. Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 12 (1959).
22. Jones, Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who Are Shareholders in Foreign Companies,
26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 225, 235 (1949).
23. Id.
24. Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd., [1970) I.C.J., 9
Int'l Legal Materials 227, 261 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Barcelona Traction, page number
being that of Int'l Legal Materials]. Similar decisions are discussed in 6 J. Moore, Digest of
International Law 644-46 (1906).
25. H. Ballantine, Corporations § 119 (rev. ed. 1946); H. Henn, supra note 18, at § 352.
26. [1931-32] Ann. Dig. 265 (No. 135).
27. Id. at 266.
28. E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 618 (1915).
29. Barcelona Traction at 268.
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shareholders of Columbian corporations. The request was refused, the United
States reasoning that a corporation organized pursuant to a local law should
have recourse only to the local government, thus no official intervention was
warranted. 31 In 1924, in Beyn Meyer & Co. v. Miller,32 the United States
Supreme Court held that the nationality of the shareholders did not affect the
corporation but that the nation of incorporation was conclusive as to nation-
ality.3
In 1932, the Mexico Plantagen case was decided on the same principle of
corporate nationality, based on the place of incorporation. The commissioner
specifically rejected both the siege sociale34 and the shareholderra concepts of
determination. Similarly, in Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry,30 where
the United States was presenting a claim on behalf of a New York corporation
whose shares were Canadian owned, the principle was again affirmed. The Com-
missioner stated that the corporation was a United States national because it
was incorporated under its laws.37
The International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case noted that
Canada had made significant efforts on behalf of the corporation. Belgium co-
operated in these efforts. The court felt that this conduct indicated recognition
by Belgium of the Canadian nationality and authority.38
The Belgian government argued in the alternative that even if Barcelona
Traction were found to be a Canadian national, Belgium, nonetheless, had a
concurrent right to protect the interests of its shareholder9" nationals, since
there was no express international law to the contrary,40 and because the share-
holders of Barcelona Traction would have no remedy unless this right were
recognized. However, when dealing with matters of corporate law, international
tribunals usually refer to and adopt municipal law since the corporate concept
develops within nations.41 This principle of municipal law is that one must
proceed in the name of the corporation to seek redress of a wrong done to it.4 2
30. J. Moore, supra note 24, at 644.
31. Id.
32. 266 US. 457 (1924).
33. The Court held that a preponderance of enemy shareholders did not render a corpora-
tion liable to the treatment set forth by the trade-with-the-enemy laws because the place
of incorporation determined the corporation's nationality.
34. [1931-321 Ann. Dig. 265 (No. 135).
35. Id. at 266.
36. 5 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 833 (1927).
37. Id. at 835. The Commissioner relied on Hamburg American Co. v. United States, 277
U.S. 138 (1928).
38. Barcelona Traction at 269.
39. Id. at 271.
40. Id. at 264.
41. Id. at 263. "In this field international law is called upon to recognize institutions of
municipal law that have an important and extensive role in the international field." Id. at
260. See also G. Schwarzenberger, supra note 19, at 393.
42. H. Ballantine, supra note 25, § 120; H. Henn, supra note 18, § 92, G. Hornstein,
supra note 21, § 711; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 1091 (1929).
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Certain exceptions to this rule have developed because of peculiar situations
which have arisen in the international sector. Each exception must be examined
to determine whether the expropriation of Barcelona Traction is analogous.
The first exception involves an injury inflicted by the state under whose
laws the corporation was formed.43 Were there no such exception, a state could
seize a corporation, compensate its nationals for their shares, and totally dis-
regard the foreign interests involved since these foreign interests would be
incapable of proceeding against this state."4 In the Ziat Ben Kiran case,4 5 a
Spanish corporation suffered damage due to a riot in the Spanish zone of
Morocco in 1921. Britain brought a claim against Spain for negligence on be-
half of one of its nationals who was a majority shareholder in the corporation.
Spain contested Britain's standing to bring such a claim since the corporation
was not a British national. This objection was rejected by the claims commis-
sion because it would have been inequitable to preclude Britain from suing
since its national suffered direct injury, and since the nation of incorporation
was the defendant in the proceeding."0
Another similar decision was reached in the El Triunjo claim. 47 In 1894 the
government of Salvador granted a concession to establish a steamboat service
to two United States citizens on the condition that they form a corporation
under Salvadorean law. The corporation was so formed and all the shares were
owned by United States nationals. Because of certain internal irregularities in
the corporation, its lawful directors were replaced with others who bankrupted
the corporation in furtherance of their personal interests. The Salvadorean
government then awarded the concession to another company. The United
States, on behalf of an American shareholder, attempted to intervene. The
Salvadorean government objected contending that since the corporation was a
Salvadorean national, the entire matter was internal. The decision of the arbi-
trator was that under the circumstances, equity justified United States espousal
of the claim. 48
The exception illustrated by these cases, however, cannot be validly applied
in the Barcelona Traction situation. Since it was a Canadian corporation al-
legedly injured by Spain, Canada always had the option to bring an action on
the corporation's behalf.
Another exception involves the situation where the corporation becomes
defunct, and therefore incapable of proceeding on its own behalf. This was il-
43. This exception was first suggested in 1932. Beckett, Diplomatic Claims in Respect of
Injuries to Companies, 17 Grotius Soc'y 175 (1932).
44. Actually the foreign shareholders, at great expense, could go to the defendant state
and litigate this question, the justiciability of which would be, at best, uncertain.
45. [1923-24] Ann. Dig. 129 (No. 102).
46. Id. at 130; Beckett, supra note 43, makes a similar argument based on a hypothetical
set of facts, at 188-93.
47. J. Moore, supra note 24, at 649.
48. Id. at 651 (adopting the reasoning of the Delagoa Railway case discussed in text
accompanying notes 49-50 infra).
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lustrated in the Delagoa Railway49 case. Here British and American citizens
formed a corporation under Portuguese law for the purpose of constructing a
railway. During the course of construction, a dispute arose between the Por-
tuguese authorities and the directors of the corporation over the exact point
of termination of the railway, whereupon the Portuguese government cancelled
the concession and seized the railroad. Both Britain and the United States
protested on the basis of the interests of their nationals. The United States in
justifying its intervention stated, "the Portuguese company, being without
remedy and having practically ceased to exist, the only recourse of those whose
property had been conficated [sic] is the intervention of their respective gov-
ernments." 0 The question was finally referred to a tribunal of Swiss jurists
who allowed the claim and made an award.51
In the present case, Barcelona Traction was in receivership in Canada. As
the court pointed out, such a status, far from impairing the rights of the cor-
poration, actually preserves the corporate entity and its rights.52 Canada was
still capable of proceeding on its behalf. For this reason, the exception is inap-
plicable.
A third exception is found in the situation where a treaty between the share-
holders' state and the expropriating state recognizes the right of each to sue
on behalf of its shareholder nationals regardless of the nationality of the cor-
poration. Examples of such treaties are found in the documents executed after
World War I where it was agreed that the shareholders of any corporation that
had been seized by Germany were entitled to indemnification.m3 These treaties
are sui generis, however, and none existed between Belgium and Spain.
The International Court of Justice considered all these exceptions to the
general rule and rightly concluded that none were applicable to the shareholders
of Barcelona Traction. The court went further, however, and established a
policy reason for its deision. "[T]he adoption of the theory of diplomatic
protection of shareholders as such, by opening the door to competing diplomatic
claims, could create an atmosphere of confusion and insecurity in international
economic relations."5
In a separate opinion Judge Fitzmaurice, although concurring in the result,
disagreed on the question of standing. While agreeing with the majority as to
the present state of the law, the judge found this present law to be unsatisfac-
tory. 5 Judge Fitzmaurice proposed that anytime the government of the incor-
49. Id. at 647, US. For. Rel. 1902, 848-852.
50. J. Moore, supra note 24, at 648.
51. Id. at 649.
52. Barcelona Traction at 267.
53. "Claims conventions not connected with the war were made between 1923 and 1926
by the United States with Panama and with Mexico, and also with Mexico by France,
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom." Jones, supra note 22, at 253 (footnotes omitted).
In addition see the commercial treaty between the United States and Japan of 1953 (proto-
col), 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.IA.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143 (193).
54. Barcelona Traction at 274.
55. Barcelona Traction at 278 (Fitzmaurice, J., concurring). "A vacuum with respect to
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porating state elects not to espouse a claim of the corporation, a nation whose
nationals are shareholders should be permitted to do so.50 The problem of
numerous claims, he asserted, would be minimal in that each nation would be
entitled to a pro rata share of recovery based on the number of shares it
represented. 57 Judge Jessup, the United States representative on the court, 8
lent additional force to this contention in a separate opinion which concurred
only with the result reached by the majority. He noted that Canada had no
abiding interest in Barcelona Traction. 50 The connections between them were
limited only to its incorporation there as a matter of convenience and the
receivership proceedings. Arguing analogously to the Nottebohm case, Judge
Jessup wrote that the test should be the "real and effective" nationality and
the nexus between the corporation and its shareholders in this instance was
more substantial. 6 He thus indirectly questioned the validity of all the deter-
minants of corporate nationality heretofore discussed insofar as they are uni-
form. His reasoning was undoubtedly based on the American corporate
concepts of shareholder derivative suits,01 citizenship for diversity purposes,
2
the convenience of the "Delaware corporation,"0 3 and the concept of beneficial
ownership. 64 While American corporate law is the most developed in the world,
the decisions upon which the International Court of Justice based its determina-
tion are all several decades old.
Another point to be considered was raised in 1964 by Judge Wellington Koo
in the preliminary Barcelona Traction decision. 5 In a separate opinion 0 he
protection should not be tolerated: otherwise shareholders would be left in an entirely help-
less condition and the result would be injustice and inequality which would be harmful for
the healthy development of international investment." Id. at 290-91 (Tanaka, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 282.
57. Id. at n.21.
58. Judge Jessup retired from the court after this decision.
59. Id. at 306. (Jessup, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 307.
61. In the United States, if a corporation refuses to seek redress, a shareholder can bring
an action in the name of and on behalf of the corporation. H. Ballantine, supra note 25,
§ 143; H. Henn, supra note 18, § 352.
62. The citizenship of a corporation for purposes of satisfying the diversity of citizenship
requirement is not only the state of incorporation, but any state in which it conducts busi-
ness. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1964).
63. "Among the 600 largest American corporations listed by Fortune, 202 are organized
in Delaware .... " This is directly traceable to the convenience of the Delaware corporation
laws. R. Baker & W. Carey, Cases and Materials on Corporations 9 (3d abr. ed. 1959).
Canada likewise provided a "charter of convenience" for Barcelona Traction. Barcelona Trac-
tion at 306 (Jessup, J., concurring).
64. The concept of beneficial ownership "enable[s] States to ignore the corporate char-
acter of an entity under municipal law and transform claims of members or creditors of such
a corporation into claims against the State in which the corporation is domiciled or incor-
porated." G. Schwartzenberger, supra note 19, at 406.
65. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., Preliminary Objections, [1964]
I.C.J. 6.
66. Id. at 51-65.
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argued that the objection as to standing should be dismissed. The exceptions
to the general rule, discussed above, that the shareholder nations cannot sue,
are based on both equitable and pragmatic considerations. The shareholders
of Barcelona Traction were equally worthy of such treatment since Canada
was merely a convenient state of incorporation and the only remedy the share-
holders now have is through the intervention of the Belgian government.0
One final point should be noted with specific reference to the practice of
providing for shareholder suits by treaty. The existence of such treaties is tes-
timony to the inadequacy of the law in this area. The parties, recognizing this
inadequacy, are thus able to correct it by means of a contractual agreement to
the contrary.68
The Barcelona Traction decision is open to criticism: first, it does not reflect
the expansion of international business and the corresponding development of
corporate sophistication; 69 second, the court circuitously avoided the problem
of providing some protection to shareholders whose corporation or whose gov-
ernment elects not to seek redress for a wrong done to them; and third,
it is inconsistent with the rationale underlying the exceptions to the rule.
In each case the exception arose when a need for protection was demonstrated."°
Perhaps, an additional exception should have been carved from the rule to
encompass the Barcelona Traction situation.
67. "[I]f the action of the national State of the company is fruitless or if it feels dis-
inclined to take steps to protect the company or discontinue its intervention without securing
the desired result, there is no real reason why the national State of the shareholders should
be precluded from exercising its own right to intervene on their behalf for effective protec-
tion." Id. at 59.
68. These provisions are commonly in two forms: either they require "prompt, just and
effective compensation in event of expropriation," or that any "'enterprise' in which na-
tionals or companies of one party have a 'substantial interest' must be accorded, in the other,
'not less than national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in all matters relating
to the taking of privately owned enterprises into public ownership ... ." Walker, Provisions
on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 388-89 (1956)
(footnote omitted).
69. "As the concept of corporate personality has become more complex and the activities
of modem private corporations of different kinds have rapidly grown in variety and range,
often extending to the territories of many States with different municipal law systems, their
organization has taken on many forms of structure with an increasing number of constituent
and associated elements. They often have subsidiaries with varying degrees of ownership and
different classes of shareholders with differentiated rights of voting and sharing in the profits
or dividends. Because of this fact of rapid growth and development of modern joint stock
companies and corporations, the problem of their protection has likewise become more com-
plex." Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., Preliminary Objections, [1964] LC.J.
6, 57 (Koo, J., concurring).
70. For a proposed remedy for shareholders see Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 173 (1965).
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Landlord-Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability.-After a brief in-
spection, plaintiff leased defendant's furnished house for two short-term inter-
vals. However, an advanced state of rat infestation required abandonment of
the premises three days later. Thereafter, plaintiff brought an action to recover
his deposit and rent payment. The trial court found a constructive eviction and
a breach of an implied warranty of habitability, entitling plaintiff to recover.'
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed, relying entirely on the im-
plied warranty of habitability and rejecting the constructive eviction doctrine.
Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
At common law, a lease was regarded primarily as a conveyance of an in-
terest in land,2 for which rent was the consideration.3 Thus, the lessor's basic
affirmative obligation was merely to deliver undisturbed possession of the land
for the term of the lease.4 The tenant alone was responsible for any necessary
repairs or services, such as heat and water.; Absent fraud, material misrepre-
sentation,6 or a provision to the contrary in the lease,7 the tenant bore the risk
that the property might be unsuitable for its intended use.8
An early exception to this strict rule of caveat emptor developed with short
term leases of furnished dwellings. In the English case of Smith v. Marrable,
1. See Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (Hawaii 1969).
2. Evans v. Faught, 231 Cal. App. 2d 698, 42 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Koehler v. Southmoor Bank & Trust Co., 40 11. App. 2d 195, 189 N.E.2d 22 (1963); Royal
Oak Wholesale Co. v. Ford, 1 Mich. App. 463, 136 N.W.2d 765 (1965); Michaels v. Brook-
chester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
3. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 111. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930);
Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917).
4. See United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770 (M.D. Pa. 1957). See also
Mitchell's, Inc. v. Friedman, 294 S.W.2d 740 (Tex Civ. App. 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775 (1957).
There is a split of authority as to whether the lessor actually has to deliver possession to
the lessee, e.g., by removing trespassers or holdovers occupying the leased premises at the
beginning of the term. See, e.g., Oriental Oil Co. v. Lindsey, 33 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930) (tenant-subtenant, duty exists). Contra, Rice v. Biltmore Apartments, Co., 141 Md.
507, 119 A. 364 (1922). In New York, the duty exists by statute. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-a
(1968).
5. Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873); Gaddis v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,
239 Ore. 553, 398 P.2d 749 (1965). See also United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1876).
6. See, e.g., Eskin v. Freedman, 53 Ill. App. 2d 144, 203 N.E.2d 24 (1964); Cole v. Lord,
160 Me. 223, 202 A.2d 560 (1964); Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y. 306, 30 N.E. 837 (1892); Perkins
v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
7. Heisenbuttel v. Comnas, 14 Misc. 2d 509, 177 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Westchester County Ct.
1958) ; Corcione v. Ruggieri, 87 R.I. 182, 139 A.2d 388 (1958).
8. Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Carney v. Bereault,
348 Mass. 502, 204 N.E.2d 448 (1965); Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
However, the lessor had a duty to disclose any latent defects which could not be discovered
by a reasonable inspection. Cole v. Lord, 160 Me. 223, 202 A.2d 560 (1964); Faber v.
Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959) (failure to disclose concealed dangerous condition
which caused injury held to allow action by injured person against lessor) ; Gaines v. Jordan,
64 Wash. 2d 661, 393 P.2d 629 (1964).
9. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
a warranty of habitability was implied in the lease. In Smith, the defendant-
lessee rented a furnished house for "five or six weeks,"' 0 but was forced to
vacate the premises after one week, due to severe pest infestation. In an action
by the lessor for the rent for the remainder of the term, the court said: "A
man who lets a ready-furnished house surely does so under the implied con-
dition or obligation... that the house is in a fit state to be inhabited."" This
rule generally has been followed in the United States,'- although the warranty
only applies to defects existing at the beginning of the lease.
13
As time progressed, the increased complexity of urban life14 led landlords
contractually to assume many of the tenants' former obligations.15 Thus, the
lessor ordinarily covenants to make certain repairs, and to provide heat, water
and other essential services.16 However, the landlord's obligations under the
lease have been construed as independent of those of the tenant.' T Thus, non-
performance of the lessor's obligations does not affect the lessee's duty to pay
rent.1 8 This duty would be abated only where the lessee rightfully abandoned
the premises, relying on the lessor's breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment
which is implied in all leases,19 requiring an eviction by the lessor,
20 persons
claiming through him,2 ' or holders of paramount title.22 The lessee's sole remedy
for the lessor's failure to make repairs or provide services was a damage action
for breach of covenant.2
To alleviate the harsh effects of this rule, the courts developed the doctrine
of constructive eviction, whereby a tenant could rescind the lease and cease
10. Id.
11. Id. at 694 (Lord Abinger, C.B.).
12. See Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947).
13. See, e.g., Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942); Delamater v.
Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931). Another exception to the caveat emptor
rule is the warranty of fitness implied in a lease for a particular purpose where the building
is under construction. See Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75
P.2d 112 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
14. See T. Quinn & E. Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of
the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225, 231-32 (1969).
15. See Id. at 232 & n.9 (where certain clauses in a standard modem lease are enumerated).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 233-34 & nn.11-13.
18. Id.
19. This covenant insures that the landlord wvill not disturb the tenant's peaceful posses-
sion, use, and enjoyment of the demised premises. See Best v. Crown Drug Co., 134 F.2d
736 (8th Cir. 1946); Carolina Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., 263 N.C. 139, 139
S.E.2d 362 (1964); L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 233 S.V.2d 286 (Tex. 1950).
20. Mosbacher v. Cleaners Enterprises, Inc., 19 Misc. 2d 624, 191 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. 1959) (dictum); Richker v. Georgandis, 323 SAV.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)
(dictum).
21. See Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
22. Ganz v. Clark, 252 N.Y. 92, 169 N.E. 100 (1929).
23. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 39
N.E. 7 (1894).
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paying rent absent physical dispossession by the landlord.2 4 Where the lack
of services was so severe, 25 or the premises so defective,20 as to substantially
interfere with the lessee's beneficial use and enjoyment of the property, and
where the tenant actually vacated the premises,27 the lease would be res-
cinded and the rent obligation would terminate as of the date of abandonment.28
This remedy is of questionable practical value,20 however, as the lessee must
determine whether the defect is sufficient to render the premises untenantable
before abandoning them. Should a court disagree with this determination and
deny rescission, the lease obligations will continue and the tenant, who has
already made a possibly expensive move, will be liable to the landlord for back
rent and possibly for damages.80 Further, in an urban society where the housing
shortage is often acute,31 it is logical to assume that the tenant generally will
be more interested in compelling future compliance with the lease and in abating
the rent until that time than in abandoning the premises.
Many states have enacted legislation requiring the lessor either to make
certain repairs32 or provide services33 in an attempt to overcome the inadequacy
of the constructive eviction remedy. Penalties include criminal sanctions, 4
24. 1 American Law of Property § 3.51 (A.j. Casner ed. 1952).
25. Nesson v. Adams, 212 Mass. 429, 99 N.E. 93 (1912) (garbage in corridor of apart-
ment, lack of hot water, elevator service, and lighting). See Overstreet v. Rhodes, 212 Ga.
521, 93 S.E.2d 715 (1956) (severe deterioration); Sewell v. Hukill, 138 Mont. 242, 356 P.2d
39 (1960) (breach of covenant to repair, resulting in extensive leakage).
26. See Washington Choc. Co. v. Kent, 28 Wash. 2d 448, 183 P.2d 514 (1947) (rat
infestation).
27. Leider v. 80 William St. Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 952, 255 N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't 1964)
(mem). See Candell v. Western Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 156 Colo. 552, 400 P.2d 909
(1965); A. W. Bannister Co. v. P. J. W. Moodie Lumber Corp., 286 Mass. 424, 190 N.E.
727 (1934) ; Maki v. Nikula, 224 Ore. 180, 355 P.2d 770 (1960). Abandonment must be within
a reasonable time, or the constructive eviction will be deemed to have been waived. Yaffe v.
American Fixture, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. 1961); Merritt v. Tague, 94 Mont. 595, 23
P.2d 340 (1933) ; Maki v. Nikula, supra. It should be noted that a limited number of courts
have abolished the requirement of abandonment under certain circumstances. See T. Quinn
& E. Phillips, supra note 13, at 237-38.
28. T. Quinn & E. Phillips, supra note 13, at 235-36. See also Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen,
Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
29. For a good criticism of this remedy, see T. Quinn & E. Phillips, supra note 13, at
236-37.
30. See Frederick Realty Corp. v. General Oil Co., 249 A.2d 418 (R.I. 1969), where such
damages were awarded.
31. See Salsich, Housing and the States, 2 Urban Law. 40 (1970).
32. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1941 (West 1954); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.471 (1967);
N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 78 (1946).
33. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.471 (1967) (plumbing, heating, ventilation and
electric wiring); N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 75 (1946), as amended, id. (Supp. 1969) (water);
id. § 77 (1946), as amended, id. (Supp. 1969) (plumbing and drainage); id. § 79 (Supp.
1969) (heat).
34. E.g., N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 304(1), (1-a) (Supp. 1969).
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abatement of rent,35 civil fines,36 and liability for damages.37 The operation of
these statutes is often cumbersome,3 8 however, and they have been subject to
much criticism.39
Recently, some courts have attempted to infuse more fle:dbility into the law
by adopting the implied warranty of habitability first seen in Smith v. Mar-
rable. However, they generally have limited the warranty to the Smith facts.
In Pines v. Perssion,40 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin disregarded the con-
structive eviction doctrine and implied a warranty of habitability in a one year
lease of a furnished house.41 Noting that legislative and administrative rules2
require maintenance in accordance with certain standards, the court concluded:
Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially (and politically)
desirable to impose these duties on a property owner-which has rendered the old
common-law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habit-
ability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative
policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of adequate
housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is too important to be
rebuffed by that obnoxious legal clich6, caveat emptor.43
In accordance with traditional contract principles, the court found the lessor's
implied warranty and the lessee's covenant to pay rent mutually dependent.44
Thus, breach of the implied warranty constituted a material failure of con-
sideration,45 abating the rental obligation under the lease and entitling lessees
35. E.g., N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 302-a (Supp. 1969); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law
§ 755 (Supp. 1969). See T. Quinn & E. Phillips, supra note 13, at 248 n.60 and statutes cited.
36. E.g., N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 304(2) (Supp. 1969).
37. Id. § 304(8).
38. To add a violation to the "rent impairing" list of the New York City Housing
Department under N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 302-a, a complicated process including public
hearings must be followed. Id. § 302-a(2)(d). N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755(I)(a)
(Supp. 1969) requires a serious violation to be recorded by a government bureau before the
obligation to pay rent can be abated.
39. See T. Quinn & E. Phillips, supra note 13, at 239-49.
40. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
41. Although the court noted that caveat emptor remained the general rule, id. at 594-95,
111 N.W.2d at 412, the defects in the electrical wiring, furnace, toilet, kitchen sink, handrail,
window screens, and doors were sufficient to justify relief. Id. at 593, 111 N.W2d at 411.
42. The court noted the safeplace statute, building codes and health regulations as exam-
ples. Id. at 595, 111 N.W.2d at 412, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 234.17 (1957) allows the lessee to
surrender the leased premises and cease paying rent if the building becomes untenantable
for any reason other than his own fault or neglect. See also N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 227
(1968).
43. 14 Wis. 2d at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
44. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413. Where covenants are independent, a breach of one
is only a partial breach of the contract which does not necessarily terminate the obligations
of the aggrieved party. See 11 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1292
(3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968). On the other hand, a material breach of a dependent covenant
would absolve the injured party from his obligation if he so elects. See id. at § 1327.
45. 14 Wis. 2d at 597, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
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to recover their deposits and labor expenses incurred in repairing the premises.40
They were liable only for the reasonable rental value of the premises during
their actual occupancy. 47
Eight years later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey expanded the Pines
rationale in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,48 a case involving a long-term com-
mercial lease. After a one-year occupancy plagued by recurrent flooding, lessee
agreed to renegotiate a five year lease in return for lessor's promise to renew
attempts to curtail further flooding. Approximately three years later, lessee was
forced to abandon the premises after a nine month period during which lessor
refused all calls for help in removing the water. In finding a constructive evic-
tion, the court discussed the trend away from caveat emptor, but expressly
declined so broad a holding.49 However, in dictum, the court did state that
fairness requires a warranty against latent defects to be implied in every lease. 0
The court also stated: "[W]henever a tenant's right to vacate leased premises
comes into existence because he is deprived of their beneficial enjoyment and
use on account of acts chargeable to the landlord, it is immaterial whether the
right is expressed in terms of breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, or
material failure of consideration, or material breach of an implied warranty
against latent defects."5'
The Lemle court disagreed with this analysis. In holding that leases of
dwelling houses contain an implied warranty of habitability,52 the Supreme
Court of Hawaii specifically rejected the constructive eviction doctrine, prefer-
ring to apply the more flexible contract principles.53 The court adopted "the
view that a lease is essentially a contractual relationship with an implied war-
ranty of habitability and fitness."154 As the court did not limit this statement
to the Smith facts, 5 Lemle may be applied to other lease situations, a result
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
49. Id. at 452-53, 251 A.2d at 272.
50. Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273. The court defined latent defects as "those the existence
and significance of which are not reasonably apparent to the ordinary prospective tenant." Id.
51. Id. at 461, 251 A.2d at 276-77. However, the implied warranty theory was not men-
tioned as an alternative means of avoiding the issue of the requisite timely abandonment,
which was justified on traditional constructive eviction grounds. Id. at 461-62, 251 A.2d at
277-78.
52. "Legal fictions and artificial exceptions to wooden rules of property law aside, we
hold that in the lease of a dwelling house, such as in this case, there is an implied warranty
of habitability and fitness for the use intended." 462 P.2d at 474.
53. "The doctrine of constructive eviction, as an admitted judicial fiction designed to
operate as though there were a substantial breach of a material covenant in a bilateral
contract, no longer serves its purpose when the more flexible concept of implied warranty of
habitability is legally available." Id, at 475.
54. Id.
55. In discussing the Smith exceptions, the court stated: "We think that the exception
itself is artificial and that it is the general rule of caveat emptor which must be re-examined."
462 P.2d at 473.
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desirable for a number of reasons. For example, the Lemle court noted that a
warranty would give the lessee a choice among the basic contract remedies:
damages, rescission, and reformation.50 In contrast, the constructive eviction
remedy is available only where there is an abandonment within a reasonable
time, despite the recent housing crisis.U Second, an implied warranty of habit-
ability would recognize the modem lease functionally as a sale of habitable
living space, potentially incorporating the protections of the law of sales s and
of tort product liability.59 The Lemle court specifically noted that the reasons
for imposing such duties on the manufacturers of chattels are "equally per-
suasive in leases of real property.3'rO
Clearly, the realities of modem life require the re-evaluation of traditional
concepts so apparent in Lemle. Our statutes, though well-meaning, provide
little practical relief. Thus, property law has not evolved sufficiently from a
society where possession of land was paramount. Serious attempts to modernize
the law, through fictions and artificial exceptions, have created a body of law
lacking in both uniformity and equity. Thus, extending the contract doctrine
of mutuality of obligations to all leases appears to be the most practical solu-
tion.
56. Id. at 475. For a breach of warranty in sales contracts, the measure of damages gen-
erally is the difference between the value of the goods received and their value as warranted.
See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-714. Incidental and consequential damages (including
damages for personal injury proximately resulting from breach of warranty) also can be
recovered in a proper case. Id. § 2-715. Applying this remedy to a lease situation, the tenant
would recover the difference between the value of the leasehold conveyed to him, and the
value of the estate had it been habitable. He might also recover the reasonable costs incurred
incident to the breach, i.e., cost of repairs, as well as for any personal injury proximately
resulting from the defects in the premises.
Recision, as an alternative to a damage action for breach of warranty, terminates the
contract and allows the aggrieved party to recover what be has given or its value. See 12
S. Williston, supra note 43, §§ 1454, 1454A, 1455, 1462. In a lease situation, rescission would
result in the termination of the lease. The tenant would be able to recover any payments
made and possibly the value of improvements made on the demised premises.
Reformation is available when there is an agreement between the parties but there is
mistake as to its expression. In granting this remedy, the court conforms the agreement to
the true intention of the parties. See 3 A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 614-15 (1960). However, this
remedy would be of little practical value in the lease situations.
57. See N.Y. Times, March 15, 1970, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1: id, March 5, 1970,
at 34, col. 3; id., Feb. 18, 1970, at 19, coL 1.
58. See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-313 to 2-315. See also Kessler, The Protection
of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law (pt. 1), 74 Yale L.J. 262 (1964); Comment, The
Application of the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Warranties: A Move Toward Strict
Liability Within the U.C.C., 38 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1969); Comment, Express Warranties
and Greater Consumer Protection From Sales Talk, 50 Marq. L. Rev. 88 (1966).
59. See W. Prosser, Torts, §§ 96-97 (3d ed. 1964); Dickerson, Products Liability: How
Good Does A Product Have To Be, 42 Ind. L.J. 301 (1967); Jaeger, Product Liability: The
Constructive Warranty, 39 Notre Dame Law. 501 (1964); Kessler, Products Liability, 76
Yale L.J. 887 (1967).
60. 462 P.2d 474.
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Tort.-Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Extended to Bystander
Not at the Scene of Injury.-Plaintiff's son was severely injured because of
the alleged negligence of the defendant in selling him packaged explosives'
which subsequently exploded. 2 Within five minutes of the explosion, 8 plaintiff
arrived at the scene of the accident, and upon witnessing her son's condition,
suffered such extreme emotional distress that she required institutionalization.
In her action to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress the
superior court granted summary judgment for the defendant. 4 The court of
appeal, in reversing the lower court, held that, if defendant's negligence in
packaging the explosives was established at trial, plaintiff could recover despite
her failure to actually witness the explosion. Archibald v. Braverman, 000 Cal.
App. 2d 000, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by witnessing
injury to another have long been out of judicial favor. Courts have resorted to
various arguments in support of this attitude: the difficulty of proving emotional
suffering and the difficulty of calculating damages; the possibility of fraudulent
claims; the fear of imposing a duty upon the defendant, the breach of which
renders him liable wholly out of proportion to the culpability of his conduct;
and a fear that allowance of bystander recovery will lead to unlimited liability.0
Accordingly various theories were devised to limit the circumstances in which
a defendant could be held liable to an emotionally injured bystander. The first
of these is the so-called "impact rule" which requires that defendant's negligent
conduct result in actual bodily contact to the plaintiff. 7 Such a rule, as might
1. The court found defendant's conduct violated a law reading in part: "No explosives
shall be sold, given, or delivered to any person under 21 years of age ... " Cal. Health &
Safety Code § 12082 (West. Supp. 1970).
2. "[A]s a result of the explosion, the boy sustained serious personal injuries causing
traumatic amputation of the right hand . . . wrist . . . forearm, traumatic amputation of
a portion of his left hand, severe lacerations of his body, grave injury to the right eye, and
loss of copious amounts of blood. .... " Archibald v. Braverman, 000 Cal. App. 2d 000, 000,
79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 724 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
3. Letter from Zerne P. Haning, Esq., to Fordham Law Review, Nov. 17, 1069. Although
it is not stated in the court's opinion, this letter from plaintiff's counsel, indicated she arrived
within five minutes of the explosion.
4. Summary judgment was granted on the basis of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), which was overruled prior to the
present appeal by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
(Amaya is hereinafter cited without inclusion of the overruling Dillon decision).
5. E.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); see Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 313 (1966). This note does not distinguish between cases involving emotional
distress causing physical injury to plaintiff, and those in which recovery is sought solely for
mental suffering, as the courts themselves have not agreed as to what constitutes "physical"
injuries. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 127-28 (1959).
6. See W. Prosser, Torts § 55 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
7. E.g., Hendren v. Arkansas City, 122 Kan. 361, 252 P. 218 (1927); Homans v. Boston
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be expected, has had harsh,8 if not absurd, results in its application.9 To avoid
the harshness of the impact test, the "zone of danger" rule developed. Under
this theory, while actual impact is not necessary, plaintiff must be found to
have been located within the area of danger created by the defendant's negligent
conduct.10 Even if the plaintiff is shown to have been actually frightened and
emotionally injured upon witnessing the event, recovery is denied if it appears
that he was too far removed from the immediate point of defendant's negligent
conduct. The zone of danger rule is limited in turn by the "fear for another"
rule." This rule, denies recovery when plaintiff's distress is caused by fear of
injury to one other than himself.'- While these theories are mutually exclusive
in application the concept of impact seems to serve as a common bond running
through them. Thus, plaintiff must sustain impact, be in the zone threatened
with impact, or fear impact to himself. Most jurisdictions apply one variation
or another of these theories to determine whether the defendant breached a
duty of care to the bystander plaintiff.
As recently as 1963 California denied recovery for mental distress caused by
witnessing injury to another. In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.13 a
mother was denied recovery for mental distress sustained when she witnessed
defendant's truck run over her infant son. The court, although finding that
California did not require impact,' 4 refused to find that defendant's duty
extended to a bystander in the vicinity of the injury, whose distress was
caused not by fear for her own safety but fear of injury to another.15 It held
that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action even though defendant directly
breached a duty to the victim since plaintiff's emotional injury was merely an
EL Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A2d 263
(1958).
8. See, e.g., Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113 Ohio App. 449, 172 N.E.2d 734 (1961); Beaty v.
Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.). Ark. 1959).
9. As pointed out by Prosser, "courts have found 'impact' in minor contacts with the
person... !" Prosser § 55, at 350. For some finer examples of "impact" see Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (feces landed upon plaintiffs lap);
Porter v. Delaware, L. & IV. R.R., 73 NJ.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the eye);
Homans v. Boston El. Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (a slight blow).
10. E.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A2d 402 (1941); Resavage v. Davies,
199 Md. 479, 86 A2d 879 (1952); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). There is an analogy here to the tort of assault, as assault admits of
recovery on proof, not of actual impact but of a threat of imminent physical contact. Cf.
Prosser § 10.
11. E.g., Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957); Strazza v. McKittrick,
146 Conn. 714, 156 A2d 149 (1959); Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916).
12. This rule seems unrealistic since its actual effect is to require that plaintiff "allege"
that he feared injury to himself. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 733, 738 n.4, 441 P2d 912,
918 nA, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78 n.4 (1968); Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emo-
tional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 523 n.44 (1968).
13. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
14. Id. at 299, 379 P.2d at 515, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
15. Id. at 315, 379 P2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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indirect consequence of the harm to the actual victim10 and not a breach of
duty as to her.17
Within five years of this decision, however, the supreme court of California
reversed its position in the landmark case of Dillon v. Legg.' 8 In Dillon a
mother and daughter were permitted to recover for emotional distress sustained
as a result of witnessing the death of a younger daughter. Refusing to apply
either the "zone of danger" and "fear for another" theories in determining
liability,19 the court directly confronted the issue of whether the defendant's
duty extended to an emotionally injured bystander. The court underplayed the
area of duty20 and concentrated on foreseeability,21 maintaining that in the case
of a child, it was forseeable that its mother would be in the immediate vicinity
and sustain emotional distress upon witnessing an injury to her child.22 Three
tests were formulated to assist in determining when a defendant could be found
to have violated a duty of due care to a bystander plaintiff: plaintiff's proximity
to the scene of the accident, whether the injury was caused by a direct shock
resulting from contemporaneous observance, and plaintiff's relationship to the
16. Id. at 298, 379 P.2d at 514, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
17. Id. at 307, 379 P.2d at 520, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 40. See also Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.
2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Routh v. Quinn, 20 Cal. 2d 488, 127 P.2d 1 (1942).
18. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
19. "We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary for recovery .... The zone-of-
danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the only reason for the requirement
of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the danger of impact."
Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (citation omitted). "The final anomaly
would be the instant case in which the sister ... would be granted recovery because she was
in the 'zone of danger,' but the mother, not far distant, would be barred from recovery."
Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
20. "[D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only .. . the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."
Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (citation omitted). The court reasoned that,
in finding no duty was owed to a bystander, past courts had avoided the essential question
of "whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's
conduct." Id. See H. Hart & A. Honor6, Causation in the Law, 230-60 (1962); Comment,
Emotional Distress Negligently Inflicted upon Spectator Plaintiff-A Suggested Model for
Identifying Protected Plaintiffs Based on Rational Interest, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 369, 400-07;
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Shock From Witnessing the Death or Injury of
Another, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 508, 516-19 (1968); Note, 26 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 71 (1969);
See also Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961).
21. "[T]he chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty . . . to plaintiff
is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case." 68 Cal. 2d
at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court went on to state that "reasonable
foreseeability does not turn on whether . . . an individual would have in actuality foreseen
the exact accident . . . [but rather requires the court to decide] what the ordinary man
under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen." Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. See Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1252 (1968).
22. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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injured party.23 The Dillon opinion was the first American decision to reject
explicitly the mechanical rules theretofore applied.24
Archibald is an extension of Dillon in its interpretation of Dillon's proximity
and contemporaneity requirements. The court found these requirements satis-
fied, stating that "the mother, having witnessed the injuries within moments
after the explosion at a time when she was attempting to render aid, fulfilled
the 'nearness' requirement in terms of distance as well as time.5 To impose
liability, the court necessarily had to find that injury to a party not at the
scene at the time of defendant's negligent conduct was, in fact, foreseeable.
In so doing the court placed strong reliance on the relationship requirement
stating, "[a] tortfeasor who causes injury to a child may reasonably expect
that the mother will not be distant and will, upon witnessing the event, suffer
emotional trauma. "26 The court was, therefore, able to solve the proximity
requirement by expanding the concept to include the "vicinity of the accident,"
and then finding it quite foreseeable that a mother in such a position should be
distressed upon witnessing her child's condition. Thus, the interpretation
Archibald gives to the proximity and contemporaneity requirements is that
plaintiff must be in the vicinity of the accident and view the resultant injury
within a reasonable time of its occurrence.2 7 But, absent a close relationship to
the injured party, there is little likelihood that presence in the vicinity and the
possibility that a subsequent viewing will result in emotional distress would
be considered foreseeable.28
23. "In determining . ..whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to
plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the
courts will take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located
near the scene... as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident. ... (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were dosely related. . ."
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant's foresetabil-
ity... ." 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
24. "Until 1968 no upper court case in this country has held that a mother could recover
for her own injuries due to shock and fear for her child as a result of an accident occurring
in her view... . Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 611, 249 N.E.2d 419, 420, 301 N.Y..2d
554, .555 (1969).
25. 000 Cal. App. 2d at 000, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
26. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
27. The court failed to define how soon plaintiff must arrive at the accident scene but
simply stated "the shock sustained by the plaintiff must be fairly contemporaneous with the
accident rather than follow when the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a latter
date." Id. (citation omitted). This is an expansion of Dillon as there the court stated plaintiff's
shock must result from "contemporaneous observance." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740.
441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
28. In its opinion the court limited the issue to "whether a mother is entitled to recover
for mental and emotional illness ... when she did not actually witness the tort but viewed
the child's injuries within moments after the occurrence... ." 000 Cal. App. 2d at 000, 79
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The strong concentration on this factor, while at the same time minimizing
the need to witness infliction of the injury, may be a step towards dispensing
with the necessity of a parent viewing the injured body of his child at all.2 9
Thus, it may be argued that when a child is severely injured it should be
reasonably forseeable that its mother will suffer upon learning of his injury, 0
and a requirement of actually viewing the child in his damaged condition is as
arbitrary a limitation as the other theories rejected by Dillon. For the present,
however, Archibald implies that the California court, while the most progressive
in the country in bystander recovery,3 ' is not yet ready to retreat from its own
mechanical rule of thumb, that the plaintiff arrive at the scene of the accident
and view his child's condition before the court will find his distress foreseeable.
While the California court has chosen to expand the Dillon decision, the
New York Court of Appeals has recently in Tobin v. Grossman 2 expressly
refused to follow the Dillon approach. In an action by a mother for her own
mental distress caused by witnessingea an injury to her child, the New York
Cal. Rptr. at 724. While Dillon stated foreseeability would be the conclusive factor In
determining defendant's duty, the Archibald court throughout its opinion stressed relation-
ship to victim, in holding plaintiff's injury foreseeable. 000 Cal. App. 2d at 000, 79 Cal. Rptr.
at 725.
29. In a recent New York decision which denied bystander recovery the court noted, "the
eyewitness limitation provides no rational practical boundary for liability. The distance from
the scene and time of notice of the accident are quite inconsequential for the shock more
likely results from the relationship with the injured party than what is seen of the accident."
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, $61
(1969). See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text. Prosser § 55, at 354 admits that such
restrictions are quite arbitrary but needed to avoid unlimited liability. 2 F. Harper & F.
James, The Law of Torts 1039 (1956), suggests the application of the general principles of
negligence since arbitrary rules do more harm than good. See Comment, Fear for Another:
Psychological Theory and the Right to Recovery, 1969 Law & Social Order 420, 427-31,
criticizing the limitations; Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1252 (1968), which suggests a refinement
of these limitations.
30. "Every parent who loses a child or whose child of any age suffers an Injury is likely
to sustain grievous psychological trauma. . . ." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249
N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 560 (1969). "[Aldvice that one's child has been killed
or injured, by telephone, word of mouth, or whatever means, even if delayed, will have in
most cases the same impact." Id. The court, however, refused to hold defendant liable.
31. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969), which held that the doctrine of strict .liability extends to an injured by-
stander in an action against a manufacturer of an allegedly defective automobile. A factor
influencing the court to adopt the strict liability approach is that of loss distribution. Should
the court take cognizance of the existence of liability insurance this "loss distribution" factor
could influence the court to extend liability in the bystander distress cases. But see Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 559-60 (1969). Finding
the burden of increasing insurance costs demands rejection of such a solution.
32. 24 N.Y2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
33. Plaintiff's complaint alleged she had witnessed the accident, but pre-trial examination
revealed she had not. The court took plaintiff's allegations as true but its opinion reflects
its awareness that should it rule in plaintiff's favor at the trial level, the case would involve
a non-eyewitness plaintiff. Id. at 612, 249 N.E.2d at 420, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56.
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court questioned "whether the concept of duty in tort should be extended to
third persons, who so not sustain any physical impact in the accident or fear for
their own safety. 3 4 Contrary to both Dillon's and Archibald's stress on the
foreseeability of the mother's distress, Tobin reasoned that "[i] f foreseeability
be the sole test, then once liability is extended the logic of the principle would
not and could not remain confined."3 5 The court rejected the proximity, con-
temporaneity and relationship considerations Dillon had suggested since "none
of these standards are of much help if they are to serve the purpose of holding
strict rein on liability . *."..,36 While Tobin was decided before Archibald it
foreshadowed the Archibald result when it stated "[a] ny rule based solely on
eye-witnessing the accident could stand only until the first case ... in which the
parent is in the immediate vicinity but did not see the accident."37 In opting
for a policy limiting liability in this area of tort law, the court, in drawing the
line where it did, seemed to realize that a decision like Archibald could lead to
the abolition of the need to view the injury at all.38 The Tobin decision, as
had Arnaya, therefore, viewed bystander distress as only an indirect conse-
quence of defendant's negligence, and refused to extend liability even to a
parent. New York thus avoided the burden that will inevitably confront the
California court, that of determining when bystander distress is not foreseeable,
as "foreseeability, once recognized, is not so easily limited." 39
Recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress has been and will
remain in a state of flux.4 The policy factors to be considered by a court in
deciding such a case are numerous.41 In addition to these policy factors, courts
invariably take a skeptical view of mental distress.4 Despite these obstacles to
34. Id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 421, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 556. See also Tymann, Bystander's
Recovery for Psychic Injury in New York, 32 Albany L. Rev. 489 (1968).
35. 24 N.Y.2d at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
36. Id. at 618, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y..2d at 561.
37. Id. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
38. Id. at 617, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.YS.2d at 560-61.
39. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. In future cases New York will
apparently resort to the "zone of danger" or "fear for another" theories in determining when
the defendant's duty extends to a bystander.
40. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1035-36 (1956); Prosser § 55, at 352-54;
Amdurky, The Interest in Mental Tranquillity, 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 339 (1963); Brody,
Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 232 (1962);
Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area of Risk, 16 Modern L. Rev. 14 (1953); Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936); see
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli,
30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944).
41. 24 N.Y.2d at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.2d at 558; see Comment, Bystander
Recovery for Mental Distress, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 429 (1969).
42. Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 Vill. L. Rev.
232-38 (1962). See also Judge Keating's dissent in Tobin demanding stringent proof of injury
to avoid spurious claims. 24 N.Y2d at 620-21, 249 N.E.2d at 425, 301 N.YS.2d at 563. See
Comment, Fear for Another: Psychological Theory and the Right to Recovery, 1969 Law &
Social Order 420, 431-33, which suggests the use of expert testimony to establish plaintiff's
injury.
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recovery the California court chose to cover new ground in Dillon and has ex-
tended its position in Archibald. In so doing the court has followed Professor
Prosser's suggestions as to when recovery should be permitted.43 Having followed
his guidelines in the past, the court might also take heed of his admonition
that "[i]t would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if
the defendant who has endangered one man were to be compelled to pay for the
lacerated feeling of ... every bystander shocked at an accident" 44 in deciding
where to draw the line. If the California court, in future decisions can demon-
strate that the concept of foreseeability enables it to adequately limit the "legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree,"'45 other jurisdictions might
perhaps be more inclined to follow California's lead.40 The application of
legalistic rules to the bystander cases has proven to be not only unjust but
opposed to experience and logic as well. 47 While these arbitrary rules do afford
an answer to a highly debatable area of the law the California court's applica-
tion of general negligence principles to the facts of each case appears to be
the more meritorious solution to the problem.
Warranties-Blood Transfusions-Extension of Implied Warranties.-
Plaintiff, while a patient at defendant hospital, allegedly became infected with
homologous serum hepatitis' as a result of a transfusion administered him by the
hospital from blood obtained, for a fee from defendant blood bank. Plaintiff
sought to recover damages against both defendants on the theories of negligence
and breach of implied and express warranties. The lower court granted the
hospital's motion to dismiss the warranty cause of action but, in denying a
motion for summary judgment by defendant National Blood Bank, Inc., held
that a cause of action for breach of warranty might lie against the blood bank
43. See Prosser § 55, at 354.
44. Id. at 353.
45. 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
46. In mental distress actions courts have recently dispensed with the impact requirement
in favor of a more liberal zone of danger theory. See, e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 000 Pa.
000, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). Although these decisions did not involve emotional distress caused
by witnessing another's injury, they reflect an effort by the courts to abandon the mechanical
rules thought necessary to limit recovery. As this area of the law develops, bystander recovery
for emotional distress should follow suit.
47. See notes 8 & 9 supra.
1. "A form of hepatitis (inflamation of the liver) caused by a virus and transmitted by
injections of blood (as in transfusions), the injection of blood products . . . or the use of
an unsterile syringe, containing the causative virus . . . .The condition is also known by
the following names: homologous serum jaundice, inoculation jaundice, post-vaccinal jaundice,
and transfusion jaundice." 1 J. Schmidt, Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder
414 (1969) (italics omitted).
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if the facts, as deduced from a full trial, so warranted it. Carter v. Inter-Faith
Hospital of Queens, 60 Misc. 2d 733, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
The vital importance of the blood transfusion in modern medicine is widely
accepted: "The development of the modern blood transfusion in the past half
century is recognized by the medical profession as one of its finest achieve-
ments. Without today's blood transfusion many of the modern surgical practices
would not be possible, and hemorrhage would be a far greater cause of death." -
The transfusion of human blood during surgery and other medical treatments
is generally regarded to be a safe medical technique.3 However, there have been
some cases in this area seeking recovery for injury or death resulting from
infected transfusions. 4 These actions, directed against both hospitals and blood
banks, have proceeded primarily on theories of negligence, 5 breach of express
warranty, 6 and breach of implied warranty.7
A cause of action in negligence generally requires the plaintiff to show the
existence of a duty owed to him by the defendant, a breach of that duty by
failure to act reasonably, and resulting injury to one within the foreseeable
orbit of dangers Most of the cases in the area of blood transfusion which have
proceeded on the negligence theory have mef with little success. Except in cases
involving obvious misfeasance, the problem lies in the difficulty of proving the
failure to act reasonably on the part of the hospital or the blood bank. The
reason for this is that, until very recently,9 there had been no test that hospitals
2. Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 640 (1958) citing
Gradwohl, Legal Medicine 524 (1954); Kabat, Blood Group Substances 2 (1956); Davidson,
Indications and Contraindications for Whole Blood and its Various Fractions, 24 Am. J.
Clin. Path. 349 (1954); Wiener, Grant, Unger & Workman, Medicolegal Aspects of Blood
Transfusions, 151 A.M.A.J. 1435 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
3. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 761, 771 (1958).
4. Transfusion is "[tihe transfer of blood from one person to another, usually by the
indirect method, i.e., by collecting the blood in a container and then introducing it into the
vein of the recipient. The direct method ... is now seldom used." 2 J. Schmidt, supra note 1,
at 827.
5. E.g., Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967).
6. Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1964)
(mene.), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1967); Napoli v.
St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
7. Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (Ct. App.
1965); Russell v. Community Blood Bank Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. CL App. Fla. 1966),
modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). The lower court also analyzed strict liability under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 NJ. 138,
249 A.2d 65 (1969); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 30S N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954);
Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist. 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956). In one Nev York
case, Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (3rd Dep't 1958)
(mem.) an attempt to impose warranty liability on a blood bank, claiming that the hospital
in purchasing the blood was acting as patient's agent, was held not to state a cause of action.
8. See W. Prosser, Torts § 301 (3d ed. 1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281
(1965). See also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1970, at 12, col. 1; id. Oct. 19, 1969, § 1 at 1, col. 2.
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or blood banks could have used to determine the presence of the virus in the
donated blood.10
Actions for breach of express warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code,11
requiring an express contractual relationship, have been successful in several
cases.12 However, success has, of necessity, been rather limited since proof of
the express statements of warranty must be shown to have been made to the
patient by an employee of the hospital, usually the doctor. 18 Such an express
promise to cure is rarely found today.14
Still other cases have proceeded on the theory of breach of implied war-
ranties, 15 contending that the hospital's supplying of "bad" blood to the patient
was a breach of the warranty of "merchantability",'" specifically that of "fitness
for ordinary uses""7-that is, the hospital and blood bank must provide safe
blood for a safe transfusion. Such cases have had mixed results. In Perimrulter v.
Beth David Hospital,'" the New York Court of Appeals held that plaintiff
failed to state a valid cause of action for breach of implied warranty of "mer-
chantable quality"' 9 of the blood against either the hospital or the blood bank.
The court's reasoning was that the warranty was applicable only to contracts
for sale and that the transaction between hospital and patient viewed in its
entirety, was in reality an agreement for care and treatment, with the incidental
sale of blood and other necessary commodities.20 Since "service" predominated,
the contract was an indivisible one and the warranty was held not to apply.
The court also recognized what a number of commentators felt to be the under-
lying basis for the decision: "If, however, the court were to stamp as a sale the
supplying of blood-or the furnishing of other medical aid-it would mean that
the hospital, no matter how careful, no matter that the disease-producing poten-
10. See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954).
See also notes 32-34 infra and accompanying text.
11. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1964).
12. E.g., Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1961). But sea Payton v.
Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d 419 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.) af'd mem.,
19 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 898 (2d Dep't 1964) (dis-
senting opinion).
14. See generally 6 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1327 (1962).
15. Negligence or other specific conduct need not be shown to establish a cause of action
in breach of implied warranty. "'Implied' warranties rest so clearly on a common factual
situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action is necessary to evidence
them and they will arise ... unless unmistakably negated." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 1;
see also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 Colum. L. Rev.
653, 670-71 (1957).
16. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1964).
17. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1964).
18. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
19. This case was decided under the Uniform Sales Act § 15(2), N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law
96 (1)-(2) (1962), as amended, N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1964). The language of these two
sections is substantially similar.
20. 308 N.Y. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
tial in the blood could not possibly be discovered, would be held responsible,
virtually as an insurer, if anything were to happen to the patient as a result
of 'bad' blood."2' - The "Sales-Service" theory of the Perlmutter decision has
been applied in a number of cases, in different jurisdictions, holding that im-
plied warranties of merchantability do not arise in "service" dominated con-
tracts.2 2 This rationale has even been extended to other contracts for service,
including those in the commercial area." Three states-Arizona,2 4 Californiaea
and Massachusetts 28 -have gone so far as to provide by statute that for
warranty purposes, the transfer of human blood constitutes a service and not
a sale.
However, the Perlmutter reasoning is vulnerable. A comparison of earlier
New York cases2r involving leasing agreements, which are not considered con-
tracts for sale28 but rather analagous to them,2 seems to indicate that the
New York law would not normally have followed the strict "Sales-Service" dis-
tinction in Perlmutter, had it not been for underlying policy considerations.P
These and other leasing agreement cases, involving the rental of trucks and
other machinery, have proceeded on the theory that a lessor-leasee relationship
contains "[m] ost of the significant criteria which in sales transactions give rise
to an implied warranty of fitness or which support a cause of action based on
strict liability in tort . . . ."3 A number of other jurisdictions have found
implied warranties to be present in various other forms of contracts for ser-
vices 2 In the area of blood transfusions, three jurisdictions, Illinois3n
21. Id. at 106, 123 N.E2d at 793-94.
22. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Whiteburst v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, I Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1965); Lovett v.
Emory Univ. Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E2d 923 (1967); Balowitsch v. Minneapolis
War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Gile v. Kennewick
Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956) (derided partly on basis of charitable
immunity).
23. E.g., Canavan v. City of Mechanicvllle, 229 N.Y. 473, 128 N.E. 882 (1920); Aegis
Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Ist Dep't 1966). See
Comment, Sale of Goods in Service-Predominated Transactions, Fordham L. Rev. 115, 119
(1968).
24. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1969).
25. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1606 (West Supp. 1970).
26. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106 § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1970) (additional subsection added
to U.C.C. § 2-316).
27. Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923); Gambino v.
John Lucas & Co., 263 App. Div. 1054, 34 N.Y.S.2d 383 (4th Dep't 1942).
28. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1): "'Contract for sale' includes both a present sale of goods
and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price."
29. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 655-60.
30. 308 N.Y. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
31. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 4S6, 212 A2d 769, 781
(1965).
32. Italia Sodeta v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 US. 315 (1964) (warranty of workman-
like service); Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963) (warranty of
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Florida,3 4 and New jersey,3 r have seemingly rejected the technical distinction
of Perlmutter. The Florida District Court of Appeals indicated that "fall-
though many of the decisions... are based on the technical distinction between
a service and a sale, the factor underlying the decisions is the inability, in the
present state of medical knowledge, to detect or remove the virus which causes
serum hepatitis." 36
The court in Carter, aware that all jurisdictions do not accept Perlmutter's
holding of no liability of the hospital and its extension to include blood banks,
apparently decided to study the question anew. In so doing, the court relied
heavily on the decisions of the other jurisdictions"7 and on the commentaries of
a number of text writers.3 8 The court first decided that the transaction with
respect to the blood bank was clearly a sale30 within the meaning of section
2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code,40 and that National Blood Bank, Inc.
plans and specifications to reasonably accomplish purpose) (decision questioned In Note,
Implied Warranties in Service Contracts, 39 Notre Dame Law. 680 (1964); Hill v. Polar
Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951) (warranty of plans and specifications for
specific purpose).
33. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 I1. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
The facts here were essentially the same as in Carter. The court however, in this case, held
that a warranty cause of action existed against the hospital and that the case must go to a
full trial.
34. The Florida courts have rejected the "Sales-Service" rationale to the extent of allowing
warranty recovery against the blood banks, but not against the hospitals. White v. Sarasota
County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So.
2d 205 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967); Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), modified, 196 So. 2d 115 ((Fla. 1967) (recovery limited to injuries
from substances capable of detection).
35. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 NJ. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969). Some idea of the
extent to which the New Jersey courts would extend implied warranties of merchantability
under the U.C.C. is shown in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) involving not a blood transfusion but the administration of a
hairdressing product. There the court stated that "[t]he policy reasons applicable In the case
of sales would likewise justify the extension of liability for breach of warranty to any com-
mercial transaction where one person supplies a product to another, whether or not the
transaction be technically considered as a sale." Id. at 286, 246 A.2d at 15.
36. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749, 752 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1966), modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967). On the appeal, the Florida Supreme Court,
while affirming as to the existence of the cause of action, revised the opinion of the District
Court of Appeals. The court held that it was error for the lower court to determine, as a
matter of law whether or not a recognized method of detecting serum hepatitis exists.
37. White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968);
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), modified,
196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967) ; Jackson v. Muhlemberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
38. 2 L. Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability § 16.03[41 (1968) ; Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A Comment a (1965).
39. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1964).
40. 60 Misc. 2d 733, 736, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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was dearly a "merchant"' with respect to the sale of blood and thus the implied
warranty of merchantability could attach to its sale.4- Having made these
determinations, the court concluded that a cause of action for breach of
warranty may lie against the blood bank and declined to dismiss as a matter
of law on the mere "Sales-Service" distinction. 43
It should be noted that the court in Carter did not postulate the blood bank's
liability as a matter of law. Rather, it stated that the facts must be "developed
at a trial so that public policy and interest may be considered.""4 Up to the
time of the Carter decision, the courts have had to balance the social interest
for the safety of the individual with the interests of the hospital and blood
bank (in light of the absence of an adequate test to determine the presence of
hepatitis in the blood) and the interests of the general public in assuring the
ready availability of blood for medical treatments. 43 Conditions are changing,
however. The traditional belief that risk of loss should be borne by those best
able to do so, the availability of insurance and other means of protection 40 for
hospitals and blood banks and the very recent disclosure of a workable, al-
though still experimental, test 47 to determine the presence of the virus in the
donor's blood, will no doubt be matters heavily weighed by the court in future
decisions.
The Carter court decision is a welcome attack on Perlmutter. It might be
critized, however, for not going far enough and holding that an action for breach
of warranty might also lie against the hospital.48 Since the public policy con-
41. "'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind .... " N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-104(1) (1964).
42. 60 Misc. 2d at 736, 304 N.Y.S2d at 101.
43. In so holding, the court, recognizing the important policy considerations involved
stated that, "[wlhile on the face of the pleadings ... there seems to exist a cause of action
for breach of warranty. .. the approach taken . . . in Jackson . . . is correct, All factors
in regard to public policy must be considered and there must be a weighing of interest be-
tween the unfortunate patients who contract the disease and the general public who are in
constant need of blood from these commercial blood banks." 60 Misc. 2d at 737, 304
N.Y.S.2d at 101.
44. Id. at 737, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 102. The appropriateness of the court's approach is further
indicated when it is considered that even if this transaction be deemed a "sale" that, when
policy is considered, a "usage of the trade" could be found, which would amount to an exclu-
sion of the warranty within the meaning of section 2-316(3) (c) of the code.
45. See generally Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969); Note,
Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 640 (1958); 18 Okla. L. Rev. 104
(1965).
46. With regard to the possible liability of the hospital, courts must also consider that
a hospital found liable should in many cases be able to recover its loss from the blood bank
supplying the "bad" blood.
47. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969, § 1 at 1, coL 2. An improved version of this test is now
being put into general use in at least one New York blood bank. Id., Feb. 4, 1970, at 12,
col. 1.
48. The court summarily granted the motion to dismiss by the hospital, on the basis of
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siderations were as equally important for the hospital as it was for the blood
bank, the better course would have been to hold that a possible warranty action
might also exist against the hospital49 and allow the facts as to its warranty to
go to trial also. 50 Three facts would have warranted such action: the ever in-
creasing criticism in New York of the Perlmutter doctrine, the decisions in other
jurisdictions directly contrary to Perlmutter, and most importantly, the fact
that the Carter court in recognizing that the transfer of blood to the hospital by
the blood bank was a sale within section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, had already struck at the basis of Perlmutter.
Perlmutter, with but a brief consideration of the case and its subsequent history with
regard to the liability of hospitals. 60 Misc. 2d at 734, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 98-99.
49. Charitable Immunity would not bar recovery against the hospital in New York.
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) (overruling prior cases
to contrary); 15 Am. Jur. 2d Charities § 158 (1964).
50. The extension of the warranty in the instant case would not create difficulties for
the New York courts. Absent statute, under the rule of Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d
195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961), "judge-made" law can be 4nmade or corrected
by the courts themselves when the court finds "inequity."
